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Abstract	
	Modern	psychology	has	long	focused	on	the	body	as	the	basis	of	the	self.	Recently,	predictive	processing	accounts	of	interoception	(perception	of	the	body	‘from	within’)	have	become	influential	in	accounting	for	experiences	of	body	ownership	and	emotion.	Here,	we	describe	embodied	selfhood	in	terms	of	‘instrumental	interoceptive	inference’,	which	emphasises	allostatic	regulation	and	physiological	integrity.	We	apply	this	approach	to	the	distinctive	phenomenology	of	embodied	selfhood,	accounting	for	its	non-object-like	character	and	subjective	stability	over	time.	Our	perspective	has	implications	for	the	development	of	selfhood,	and	illuminates	longstanding	debates	about	relations	between	life	and	mind,	implying	–	contrary	to	Descartes	–	that	experiences	of	embodied	selfhood	arise	because	of,	and	not	in	spite	of,	our	nature	as	‘beast	machines’.			
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Being	somebody	
	What	does	it	mean	to	be	a	‘self’?	While	some	have	argued	that	there	may	be	no	‘thing’	that	is	a	self	[1],	experiences	of	selfhood	are	among	the	most	pervasive	aspects	of	human	consciousness.	Perceptions	of	the	external	world	come	and	go,	but	it	is	their	relation	to	the	experience	of	‘being	an	experiencing	subject’	that	gives	these	perceptions	meaning,	value,	and	emotional	relevance.	How	perceptual	experiences	of	‘being	a	self’	are	constructed	is	therefore	a	key	question	for	cognitive	science.		Experiences	of	having	a	body,	and	of	being	a	body,	are	among	the	most	basic	aspects	of	conscious	selfhood	[2,	3]	upon	which	higher-level	properties	of	selfhood,	such	as	the	experience	of	being	a	distinctive	individual	across	time,	may	rest.	Powerful	examples	of	the	constructed	nature	of	selfhood	are	found	in	experimental	and	clinical	alterations	of	experiences	of	body	ownership.	Experimental	manipulations,	such	as	the	rubber-hand	illusion	(RHI)	[4]	and	neuropsychiatric	disorders	such	as	asomatognosia	or	somatoparaphrenia	[5,	6]	demonstrate	that	experiences	of	body	ownership	do	not	follow	from	the	mere	presence	of	a	physical	body-part.	Instead,	the	brain	is	using	available	sensory	evidence	to	construct	experiences	of	(dis)ownership	that	go	well	beyond	the	presence	or	absence	of	physical	body-parts.	The	RHI	shows	that	a	physical	body-part	is	not	necessary	for	a	corresponding	experience	of	ownership.	In	the	RHI,	such	experiences	extend	to	encompass	non-self-objects	(e.g.,	fake	hands)	given	appropriate	multisensory	correlations	(e.g.,	seeing	and	feeling	touch	on	the	fake	hand)	and	sensory	inputs	that	align	sufficiently	with	prior	beliefs	(e.g.,	a	fake	hand	that	looks	sufficiently	like	a	real	hand	and	is	roughly	where	a	hand	should	be).	Asomatognosia	shows	that	a	physical	body-part	is	not	sufficient	for	experiences	of	body	ownership.	Aberrant	processing	of	afferent	sensory	signals	from	the	affected	limbs,	or	dysfunction	of	high-level	body	representations	[6],	leads	to	the	experience	that	a	(physically	present	limb)	is	not	part	of	one’s	body.		These	manipulations	of	experiences	of	body	ownership	encourage	interpretation	in	terms	of	multisensory	integration	and	predictive	self-modelling	[7-10].	In	this	view,	such	experiences	are	based	on	inferences	to	the	best	explanation	–	Bayesian	‘best	guesses’	–	which	are	continually	formed	and	reformed	on	the	basis	of	neurally-encoded	prior	expectations	and	afferent	sensory	data.	The	computational	principles	enabling	these	inferences	are	just	the	same	as	described	for	perception	of	the	external	world	in	frameworks	like	predictive	
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processing	[11-13],	in	which	perceptual	content	is	generally	assumed	to	be	conveyed	by	top-down	predictions	about	the	hidden	causes	of	sensory	signals.			Here,	we	extend	this	approach	to	the	embodied	self	by	emphasising	two	aspects	of	the	relevant	predictive	models:	interoception	(the	sense	of	the	body	‘from	within’,	[14]),	and	the	use	of	predictive	models	for	control	(instrumental	inference)	rather	than	for	discovery	(epistemic	inference)	[15,	16].		We	start	by	reviewing	the	basics	of	predictive	processing	and	how	it	may	apply	to	interoception,	especially	for	purposes	of	homeostatic	regulation	[8,	16-18].	We	then	develop	this	view	in	the	context	of	mid-twentieth	Century	cybernetics	and	the	more	recent	free-energy	principle,	both	of	which	locate	the	origin	of	model-based	perception	in	control	and	regulation.	Our	core	contribution	is	to	use	this	perspective	to	account	for	the	distinctive	phenomenology	of	embodied	selfhood,	with	a	focus	on	its	relation	to	‘objecthood’	and	the	subjective	stability	of	the	self	across	time.	We	conclude	by	discussing	implications	for	developmental	trajectories	[19,	20],	psychiatric	conditions	and	for	the	relationships	between	consciousness,	mind,	and	life	[21-23].		
Predictive	processing	and	interoceptive	inference	
	Taking	the	body	as	the	basis	of	selfhood	highlights	the	importance	of	interoceptive	sensory	channels,	which	convey	information	about	the	global	physiological	condition	of	the	body	[14,	24].	Recently,	interoception	has	been	conceptualised	within	the	framework	of	predictive	processing	[8,	16,	17,	25,	26].	Just	like	predictive	processing	models	of	vision	[27],	models	of	interoceptive	inference	propose	that	interoceptive	experiences	result	from	probabilistic	inference	about	the	causes	of	viscerosensory	inputs,	according	to	Bayesian	principles	[8,	16,	18].	These	models	initially	focussed	on	emotional	experiences	as	the	relevant	consequences	of	interoceptive	inference.	On	this	view,	emotional	feeling	states	are	shaped	by	the	brain’s	‘best	guess’	of	the	causes	of	interoceptive	signals	(Box	1).			The	neurocognitive	mechanisms	of	interoceptive	inference	are	assumed	to	follow	the	same	principles	of	predictive	processing	in	other	modalities.	Essentially,	the	brain	embodies	and	deploys	a	generative	model	which	encodes	prior	beliefs	–	in	the	form	of	probability	distributions	–	about	sensory	inputs	and	their	causes	in	the	body	and	in	the	world	[28].	In	popular	implementations	like	predictive	coding	[27],	neuronal	representations	in	higher	or	deeper	levels	of	neuronal	hierarchies	generate	predictions	about	representations	in	lower	
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levels.	These	descending	predictions	are	compared	with	lower-level	representations	to	form	a	prediction	error,	which	is	passed	back	up	the	hierarchy	to	update	higher-level	representations.	The	exchange	of	signals	between	adjacent	levels	resolves	prediction	error	at	every	level,	resulting	in	a	hierarchically	deep	neurally-encoded	explanation	for	sensory	inputs,	and	it	is	this	explanation	which	constitutes	the	resulting	percept	[29,	30].			Two	aspects	of	this	process	are	particularly	important	for	what	follows.	First,	sensory	prediction	error	signals	are	precision-weighted	such	that	signals	with	high	(expected)	precision	(inverse	variance)	have	greater	influence	in	updating	descending	predictions.	Note	that	the	precision	of	sensory	data,	just	like	its	mean	(or	any	other	distributional	property),	has	to	be	inferred.	Inferred	precision	depends	both	on	the	empirical	variance	of	the	sensory	data	and	on	prior	expectations	about	precision.	The	optimisation	of	precision-weighting,	through	changes	in	precision-related	priors	(precision	expectations)	is	frequently	associated	with	attention	[31].	Intuitively,	paying	attention	to	sensory	data	is	equivalent	to	increasing	its	expected	precision	so	that	the	sensory	data	has	greater	impact	on	perception.		Equally	important	is	that	sensory	prediction	errors	can	be	minimized	by	performing	actions	to	change	sensory	data,	as	well	as	by	updating	predictions.	Minimizing	prediction	error	through	action	is	called	active	inference	[32].	For	example,	visual	prediction	error	can	be	reduced	by	moving	one’s	eyes	until	a	prediction	is	fulfilled:	if	I	expect	to	see	a	nose	but	am	currently	perceiving	an	ear,	a	simple	saccade	will	often	make	the	nose	prediction	come	true.	Actions	themselves	can	be	thought	of	as	the	fulfilment	of	proprioceptive	(or	oculomotor)	predictions	[32,	33]:	an	intended	movement	occurs	by	predicting	its	proprioceptive	consequences.	Crucially,	this	applies	also	to	interoception,	where	interoceptive	prediction	errors	can	be	minimized	through	autonomic	reflexes,	or,	more	broadly,	‘intero-actions’	[34].	In	general,	active	inference	depends	on	the	ability	of	generative	models	to	make	predictions	about	the	sensory	consequences	of	specific	actions	[35].			Putting	these	features	together,	one	can	see	that	active	inference	provides	a	means	for	control	or	regulation	of	inferred	causes	(the	hidden	or	latent	variables	from	which	sensory	signals	originate).	Given	some	sensory	prediction	error,	whether	predictions	are	updated,	or	whether	actions	are	performed	to	change	the	sensory	data,	depends	on	precision	weighting.	Decreasing	the	expected	precision	of	sensory	prediction	errors	will	lead	to	predictions	dominating,	so	that	prediction	errors	will	be	resolved	through	action.	For	example,	motor	
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actions	are	elicited	when	descending	proprioceptive	predictions	set	equilibrium	points	which	engage	classical	reflex	arcs	[33,	35].	This	entails	lowering	the	expected	precision	of	proprioceptive	prediction	errors,	corresponding	to	diminished	attention	to	proprioceptive	and	kinaesthetic	sensations.	This	in	turn	explains	observations	of	increased	sensory	thresholds	in	these	modalities	during	movements	[36].				This	is	a	brief	description	of	predictive	processing	and	active	inference.	We	next	turn	to	its	relevance	for	embodied	selfhood	by	revisiting	some	seminal	concepts	in	cybernetics,	and	some	recent	developments	in	theoretical	neurobiology,	which	together	emphasise	the	importance	of	predictive	modelling	for	control.		
From	essential	variables	to	instrumental	(control-oriented)	inference	
	All	living	organisms	attempt	to	maintain	their	physiological	integrity	in	the	face	of	danger	and	opportunity.	Arguably,	this	is	the	basic	evolutionary	and	functional	imperative	for	having	a	brain.	In	the	1950s	the	cybernetician	W.	Ross	Ashby	formalized	this	idea	in	terms	of	second-order	homeostasis	of	essential	variables.	In	physiological	settings,	these	variables	correspond	to	quantities	like	blood	pressure,	heart	rate,	blood	sugar	levels	and	the	like:	quantities	which	must	remain	within	tight	bounds	in	order	for	an	organism	to	survive.	In	Ashby’s	framework,	when	essential	variables	move	outside	organism-specific	viability	limits	(following	a	breakdown	in	first-order	homeostatic	processes,	like	simple	feedback),	adaptive	processes	are	triggered	which	re-parameterize	the	system	until	it	reaches	a	new	equilibrium	in	which	homeostasis	is	restored	[37].	Ashby	called	this	(second-order)	process	‘ultrastability’:	an	ultrastable	system	is	capable	of	finding	a	new	stable	configuration	with	its	environment,	even	given	perturbations	sufficient	to	disrupt	ongoing	homeostatic	processes.	In	early	descriptions	of	ultrastability,	second-order	re-parameterization	was	implemented	as	a	random	process.	For	example,	Ashby’s	famous-at-the-time	‘homeostat’	would	randomly	explore	different	settings	once	an	essential	variable	had	transgressed	its	bounds,	and	would	continue	to	do	so	until	first-order	homeostasis	had	been	restored.	However,	random	exploration	of	parameter	settings	is	inefficient	and	biologically	implausible.	(The	mathematician	Norbert	Wiener	called	the	homeostat	‘one	of	the	great	philosophical	contributions	of	the	present	day’;	see	http://blogs.bl.uk/science/2016/04/the-thinking-machine.html).		
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A	more	useful	solution	is	provided	by	models	capable	of	explicitly	inferring	bodily	states	(essential	variables)	and	their	homeostatically-relevant	trajectories	over	time,	and	of	acting	on	these	states	in	order	to	assure	ongoing	physiological	integrity	[37].	In	embodied	settings,	model-based	control	is	mandated	by	several	factors.	First,	the	hidden	causes	of	interoceptive	signals	–	i.e.	the	targets	of	physiological	regulation,	the	values	of	essential	variables	–	are	not	directly	available	to	the	brain’s	control	mechanisms	and	must	be	inferred.	Indeed,	this	is	the	primary	rationale	for	proposals	of	interoceptive	inference	[8,	16,	17].	Second,	model-based	control	allows	anticipatory	responses,	since	models	allow	inferences	about	future	bodily	states	and	their	trajectories,	and	support	conditional	predictions	about	these	states	given	specific	(autonomic	or	motor)	actions.	In	physiological	settings,	anticipatory	control	can	be	critical.	Waiting	for	tightly	regulated	quantities	like	blood	acidity	to	exceed	their	bounds	before	engaging	compensatory	responses	may	be	lethal	[38].	Third,	and	related,	hierarchical	models	allow	anticipatory	control	to	play	out	across	multiple	levels,	so	that	regulation	at	one	level	may	be	temporarily	relaxed	(or	altered	through	imposing	a	new	set-point)	in	order	for	homeostasis	to	be	preserved	at	higher	levels	or	over	longer	timescales.	For	example,	transient	changes	in	blood	pressure	regulation	may	be	necessary	to	enable	fight-flight	responses	when	encountering	a	predator	[17,	37,	38].	Simply	standing	up	from	your	desk	imposes	similar	anticipatory	demands,	though	less	dramatically.	Altogether,	these	capabilities	describe	a	transition	from	(first-order)	homeostasis	to	the	more	general	process	of	allostasis:	the	regulation	of	bodily	states	through	change	[37,	39,	40].					This	notion	of	allostatic	regulation	captures	the	core	idea	of	instrumental	(control-oriented)	interoceptive	inference.	In	just	the	same	way	as	described	for	motor	actions,	instrumental	interoceptive	(active)	inference	involves	descending	interoceptive	predictions	being	transcribed	into	physiological	homeostasis	by	engaging	autonomic	reflex	arcs	(intero-actions).	However,	whereas	motor	actions	may	serve	different	goals	over	time,	requiring	ever-changing	changing	proprioceptive	set-points,	physiological	homeostasis	entails	maintaining	physiological	essential	variables	within	tight	ranges	of	viability	at	all	times.	We	will	see	later	that	this	difference	has	implications	for	the	subjective	stability	of	embodied	selfhood.			The	general	idea	that	the	brain	encodes	models	for	predictive	inference	and	allostatic	regulation	is	not	new.	In	1970,	Ashby,	with	Roger	Conant,	proposed	the	influential	“good	
regulator	theorem”	which	states	that	“every	good	regulator	of	a	system	must	be	a	model	of	
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that	system”	[41].	The	overlooked	perceptual	control	theory	of	Powers	similarly	emphasises	control,	arguing	that	the	purpose	of	behaviour	is	to	regulate	perceptual	variables:	“control	systems	control	what	they	sense,	not	what	they	do”	[42].	For	example,	when	catching	a	cricket	ball,	experienced	cricketers	move	so	as	to	control	a	perceptual	variable	(the	rate	of	change	of	the	tangent	of	the	angle	of	elevation	to	the	ball),	facilitating	their	arrival	in	the	right	place	at	the	right	time	[43].		More	recently,	allostatic	regulation	has	become	central	to	accounts	of	perception	and	action	under	the	free-energy	principle,	which	starts	from	the	premise	that	all	systems	which	preserve	their	identity	over	time	must	resist	a	tendency	towards	dispersion	of	their	internal	states,	by	minimizing	the	long-run	unexpectedness	or	entropy	of	these	states	–	which	under	some	simplifying	assumptions	corresponds	to	minimization	of	precision-weighted	sensory	prediction	errors	[44]	(Box	2).	Explicit	links	between	allostatic	regulation	and	interoceptive	inference	have	also	now	been	elaborated,	highlighting	implications	for	functional	neuroanatomy	[45,	46],	and	psychiatric	disorders	like	depression	[18,	37,	47];	see	Box	3.				These	various	perspectives	all	highlight	a	subtle	but	significant	distinction	between	a	system	‘being	a	model’,	in	the	sense	that	it	can	be	described	in	a	model-based	way,	and	‘having	a	model’,	in	the	sense	of	explicitly	encoding	a	probabilistic	model	(of	the	hidden	causes	of	sensory	signals,	their	trajectories,	and	conditional	dependencies	on	actions).	The	potential	relevance	of	this	distinction	for	the	phenomenology	of	selfhood	is	discussed	further	in	Box	4.			The	argument	so	far	is	as	follows.	Basic	imperatives	towards	sustained	physiological	integrity	mandate	the	implementation	of	control-oriented	predictive	models.	These	hierarchically	organised	models	implement	active	inference	on	interoceptive	signals	to	enable	allostatic	regulation.	Lower	hierarchical	levels	implement	autonomic	reflexes,	while	higher	levels	recruit	multimodal	and	amodal	prior	expectations	about	the	physiological	consequences	of	actions,	supporting	behavioural	regulation	of	physiological	states	over	longer	periods	of	time	and	in	different	contexts.	Just	as	visual	experience	can	be	understood	as	the	content	of	visual	predictions,	interoceptive	experience	can	be	thought	of	as	the	content	of	the	joint	set	of	predictions	geared	towards	allostasis.	With	these	pieces	in	place,	we	can	now	examine	how	this	perspective	on	interoceptive	inference	sheds	new	light	on	the	phenomenology	of	embodied	selfhood.		
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The	phenomenology	of	‘being	a	body’			When	considering	the	phenomenology	of	selfhood,	it	is	not	enough	to	say	that	emotional	and	self-related	experiences	are	the	way	they	are	(and	are	different	to,	for	example,	visual	experiences)	because	they	emphasise	predictions	about	interoceptive	(rather	than	visual)	signals.	Instead,	it	is	helpful	to	consider	the	nature	of	predictions	associated	with	interoceptive	inference,	especially	their	control-oriented	(instrumental)	bias.		
Epistemic	and	instrumental	inference		On	the	view	we	propose,	the	function	of	perception	is	not	to	recover	a	veridical,	action-independent	representation	of	the	external	environment	or	body.	Instead,	predictive	perception	–	in	any	modality	–	is	ultimately	geared	towards	driving	actions	that	preserve	physiological	integrity	of	the	organism.	In	other	words,	we	do	not	perceive	the	world	(and	self)	as	it	is,	but	as	it	is	useful	to	do	so.	This	may	involve	systematically	‘misperceiving’	the	environment,	by	criteria	of	veridicality.	At	one	level,	the	ability	to	elicit	motor	or	autonomic	actions	through	the	fulfilment	of	descending	predictions	could	not	happen	without	suppressing	(‘veridical’)	perception	of	the	current	state-of-affairs,	through	sensory	attenuation.	(We	recognise	that	empirical	evidence	for	interoceptive	sensory	attenuation	remains	to	be	found,	and	that	this	process	may	be	realised	differently	than	in	the	motor	domain	due	to	different	time	constants	[36].)			At	another	level,	one	can	distinguish	between	‘epistemic’	and	‘instrumental’	varieties	of	active	inference.		Epistemic	inference	prescribes	‘information-gathering’	actions	that	enhance	the	predictive	capabilities	of	a	model,	in	order	to	enhance	its	regulatory	capabilities	in	the	long	run	[48,	49].	Instrumental	inference	(equivalently,	control-oriented	inference)	prescribes	actions	that	exploit	these	models	for	ongoing	control	and	regulation	[15,	50,	51].		Both	concepts	invite	description	as	‘inference’	since	both	involve	‘going	beyond	the	data’	in	virtue	of	generative	modelling	[13].	They	are	also	both	forms	of	active	inference	since	they	both	prescribe	actions.	Note	that	there	is	no	necessity	that	predictive	models	most	useful	for	control	are	those	that	represent	sensory	signals	and	their	causes	in	an	action-independent,	veridical	manner	[15,	52,	53].	This	motivates	a	further	distinction,	or	spectrum,	between	epistemic	actions	that	enhance	a	predictive	model	in	terms	of	veridicality,	and	those	deployed	to	improve	its	regulatory	capabilities.	Put	this	way,	the	deep	interdependencies	between	
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perception	and	action	can	be	understood	in	terms	of	an	ever-shifting	balance	between	the	discovery	of	behaviourally	(allostatically)	relevant	features	of	the	environment	(epistemic	inference)	and	the	control	or	regulation	of	the	causes	of	sensory	signals	(instrumental	or	control-oriented	inference).				
The	embodied	self	is	not	just	an	object		The	distinction	between	epistemic	and	instrumental	inference	helps	explain	aspects	of	the	phenomenology	of	embodied	selfhood,	especially	in	terms	of	its	relation	to	‘objecthood’.	Consider	that	in	visual	experience,	perceptual	scenes	seem	organised,	to	a	large	extent,	into	discrete	objects	and	the	spaces	between	them.	In	some	sense,	the	experience	of	an	object	includes	the	perception	of	surfaces	that	are	not	directly	represented	in	sensory	data.	When	we	perceive	an	object,	we	perceive	it	as	having	an	external	existence,	with	a	‘back	and	sides’	[54],	as	‘really	existing’	out	there	in	the	world	[55,	56].			Through	some	modalities	(e.g.,	vision)	the	body	too	can	be	experienced	as	an	object.	You	may	(visually)	perceive	the	hand	in	front	of	me	as	your	hand	–	an	experience	of	body	ownership	which	can	extend	to	the	entire	body-as-object	[57,	58],	and	which	can	be	influenced	by	interoceptive	signals	[59,	60].	However,	many	aspects	of	self-related	phenomenology	are	not	like	this.	William	James	put	it	this	way:	“contrary	to	the	perception	of	an	object,	which	can	be	perceived	from	different	perspectives	or	even	cease	to	be	perceived,	we	experience	‘the	feeling	of	the	same	old	body	always	there’”	[61]	(p.242).	For	example,	affective	experiences	-	like	emotions	-	do	not	occupy	a	volume	in	space,	nor	do	they	have	a	back-and-sides.			Basic	experiences	of	‘embodied	selfhood’	are	even	more	challenging	to	describe	[2].	There	is	a	very	low-level	aspect	of	embodied	self-experience	perhaps	best	described	as	the	experience	of	being	a	living	organism,	as	opposed	to	‘owning’	a	particular	body,	which	seems	to	resist	easy	analysis	in	terms	of	the	sort	of	perceptual	inference	responsible	for	exteroceptive	perceptual	scenes.	This	inchoate	(and	‘transparent’,	see	[62])	phenomenology	of	‘being	a	body’	describes	a	background	experience	of	selfhood	that	shades	into	mood	and	emotion	at	one	end,	and	into	experiences	of	body	ownership	at	the	other.	This	deeply	rooted	aspect	of	experienced	embodiment	involves	no	strong	component	of	objecthood.	Crudely	put,	we	do	not	experience	‘being	a	body’	in	terms	of	the	spatial	arrangement	of	our	internal	organs	as	objects.			
	 11	
This	difference	in	phenomenology	can	be	explained	by	the	following	hypothesis,	based	on	the	distinction	between	epistemic	and	instrumental	inference.	Your	visual	experience	of	a	mug	has	the	phenomenological	character	of	objecthood	because	your	brain	is	making	epistemic	predictions	about	how	mug-related	sensory	signals	would	change	given	this-or-that	(epistemic)	action.	You	perceive	a	mug	as	having	a	back	because	your	brain	encodes	predictions	that	the	back	would	come	into	view,	if	you	rotated	the	mug.	More	generally,	perceptual	inferences	have	the	phenomenological	character	of	objecthood	when	the	underlying	generative	models	deploy	a	rich	set	of	epistemic	predictions	about	sensory	signals	you	would	encounter	were	you	to	make	(conditional)	or	if	you	had	made	(counterfactual)	this-or-that	action	[55,	56].	This	is	simply	a	predictive	processing	version	of	the	fundaments	of	sensorimotor	contingency	theory	[63]	which	argues	that	the	phenomenology	of	objecthood	comes	from	the	‘mastery’	of	the	relevant	sensorimotor	contingencies.		In	interoceptive	inference,	however,	actions	-	whether	autonomic	or	motoric	-	serve	predominantly	to	regulate	interoceptive	sensations	[18,	47]	(c.f.	perceptual	control	theory	[42]).	Perceptual	predictions	relevant	to	interoceptive	inference	have	more	to	do	with	instrumental	predictions	about	the	physiological	consequences	of	actions,	than	about	(epistemically)	discovering	more	about	some	particular	external	or	internal	state-of-affairs.	Interoceptive	inference	therefore	marks	a	different	balance	from	typical	exteroceptive	inference	on	the	trade-off	between	refining	a	model	(epistemic	inference)	and	deploying	a	model	for	regulation	(instrumental	inference).	Note	that	both	epistemic	and	instrumental	inference	involve	conditional	or	counterfactual	predictions,	but	in	different	ways:	in	the	former	case,	to	predict	how	an	action	would	improve	the	model;	in	the	latter,	to	predict	how	an	action	would	affect	physiological	homeostasis,	given	a	model.		Based	on	these	distinctions,	we	propose	that	instrumental	inference	undergirds	a	different	phenomenology	than	epistemic	inference	related	to	discovery.	Instead	of	delivering	a	phenomenology	of	objecthood,	instrumental	(control-oriented)	interoceptive	inference	plausibly	underlies	a	phenomenology	related	to	the	evaluation	of	the	allostatic	consequences	of	regulatory	actions.	A	non-localised,	non-object-based	phenomenology	associated	with	both	mood	and	emotion,	and	with	the	pre-reflective	(i.e.,	non-reflexive)	self-related	experience	of	being	an	embodied	organism	[15,	18].					
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The	stability	of	the	self	over	time		Another	striking	aspect	of	embodied	selfhood,	at	least	in	non-pathological	situations,	is	its	subjective	stability	over	time.	Perceptions	of	the	world	come-and-go,	but	experiences	of	selfhood	seem	stable	and	continuous	over	many	different	time	scales.	How	can	this	be	accounted	for?				One	possibility	is	that	the	hidden	causes	of	self-related	perceptions	may	indeed	be	more	stable	than	the	hidden	causes	of	world-related	signals,	simply	due	to	their	origin	in	a	relatively	unchanging,	and	allostatically	controlled,	milieu.	As	mentioned	previously	and	in	contrast	to	active	inference	in	the	motor	system,	instrumental	interoceptive	inference	requires	maintaining	physiological	essential	variables	within	tight	ranges	of	viability	across	time.	This	entails	precise	prior	expectations	that	these	variables	and	their	trajectories	remain	within	such	stable	ranges,	with	corresponding	sensory	attenuation	of	interoceptive	signals.	The	resulting	interoceptive	perceptions	will	therefore	be	drawn	towards	stable	inferences	about	self-related	variables	and	their	trajectories.			In	addition,	as	phenomena	like	change	blindness	amply	demonstrate	[63],	perception	of	change	is	not	the	same	as	change	of	perception.	The	subjective	stability	of	selfhood,	at	some	levels,	may	reflect	an	adaptive	form	of	‘self-change-blindness’.	In	this	view,	allostatic	regulation,	and	apparent	goal-directed	behaviour	ultimately	motivated	by	such	regulation,	may	depend	on	not	perceiving	that	the	relevant	aspects	of	selfhood	(i.e.,	the	targets	for	allostatic	regulation)	are	changing,	in	order	to	provide	stable	targets	for	instrumental	inference.	This	would	be	the	case	even	if	these	aspects	of	self,	and	perceptions	of	self,	are	in	fact	changing.	This	is	an	application	of	the	idea,	outlined	above,	that	instrumental	inference	may	require	systematic	‘mis-perception’	of	the	hidden	causes	of	sensory	signals.	Put	simply,	we	will	be	better	able	to	maintain	our	physiological	and	psychological	integrity	and	identity	over	time	if	we	do	not	(expect	to)	perceive	ourselves	as	continually	changing.	This	applies	at	many	levels	of	selfhood,	from	tightly	regulated	aspects	of	the	interoceptive	self,	to	the	preservation	of	a	stable	personal	identity	during	temporally	extended	social	interactions	over	days,	months,	and	years	–	including	interactions	with	oneself	via	recall	of	episodic	and	autobiographical	memories	and	planning	for	the	future.	Speculatively,	breakdowns	in	such	self-change-blindness	may	be	implicated	in	psychiatric	disorders	in	which	the	stability	of	the	
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self	becomes	subjectively	unreliable,	such	as	in	schizophrenia,	dementia	and	delirium,	or	multiple	personality	disorder.				
Concluding	remarks	and	future	perspectives			Experiences	of	selfhood	range	from	basic	experiences	of	‘being’	and	‘having’	a	body,	up	to	reflective	self-awareness	and	the	social	self	[8,	64]	(see	Box	4).	We	have	proposed	that	these	experiences	are	grounded	in	processes	of	instrumental	(control-oriented)	interoceptive	inference	that	underpin	allostatic	regulation	of	physiological	essential	variables.	This	perspective	draws	together	perceptual	inference	schemes,	such	as	predictive	processing	and	active	inference,	with	sensorimotor	theory	[42,	65]	and	concepts	from	mid-twentieth-century	cybernetics	[41,	66]	that	emphasise	model-based	control,	with	deep	links	to	allostasis	and	physiological	integrity	finding	formal	expression	in	the	free	energy	principle	([44,	67],	Box	2).	This	perspective	accounts	for	distinctive	aspects	of	the	phenomenology	of	selfhood,	including	its	relationship	to	‘objecthood’	[55]	and	its	subjective	stability	over	time.	It	may	also	shed	light	on	aspects	of	aberrant	self-experience	(Box	3),	and	its	developmental	trajectory	–	especially	in	relation	to	caregiver	dynamics	(Box	5).		The	story	has	involved	two	primary	‘inversions’	with	respect	to	the	classical	view	of	perceptual	content	arising	from	‘bottom-up’	(or	outside-in)	elaboration	of	sensory	signals	[68,	69].	First,	perceptual	content	is	conveyed	by	top-down	(or	inside-out)	predictions	about	the	causes	of	sensory	signals,	rather	than	by	the	sensory	signals	themselves.	This	is	common	to	all	most	if	not	all	predictive	processing	frameworks	[11,	12].	(Note	that	we	avoid	the	terms	‘feedforward’	and	‘feedback’	since	these	carry	implications	about	error	signals	which	do	not	match	the	architecture	of	predictive	processing	[70].)	Second,	interoceptive	inference,	and	instrumental	inference	more	broadly,	should	not	be	considered	as	a	generalisation	of	predictive	coding	from	exteroceptive	modalities	like	vision.	Instead,	perceptual	content	in	all	modalities,	including	modalities	such	as	vision,	is	a	consequence	or	generalisation	of	a	fundamental	imperative	towards	physiological	regulation	[15].	Seen	this	way,	all	perceptual	content	is	underpinned	by	inferential	mechanisms	that	have	a	functional,	ontological,	and	phylogenetic	basis	in	allostasis.			The	deep	physiological	roots	of	instrumental	inference	gesture	towards	a	third	‘inversion’,	which	has	to	do	with	the	debated	connection	between	‘life’	and	‘mind’	[71],	and	which	traces	back	to	Enlightenment	discourse	about	the	nature	of	the	soul	and	the	relevance	of	the	body	
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[72].	For	Descartes,	non-human	animals	were	‘beast	machines’	without	souls	or	conscious	experiences	of	any	kind,	at	least	without	any	kind	of	experience	warranting	moral	status.	Their	flesh-and-blood	nature	was	highlighted	as	irrelevant	to	the	presence	of	consciousness	or	‘soul’.	Writing	after	Descartes,	in	1748,	Julien	de	La	Mettrie	took	this	idea	to	its	extreme:	if	animals	are	beast	machines	then	so	are	humans,	since	humans	are	also	animals	([73];	see	also	[72,	74]).	Our	view	suggests	the	opposite:	that	there	are	intimate	connections	between	the	functional	imperatives	imposed	by	our	physiological	reality	–	by	‘the	drive	to	stay	alive’	that	animates	all	living	creatures	–	and	the	predictive	machinery	that	implements	instrumental	interoceptive	inference.			This	view	pushes	back	against	popular	views	of	mind	and	self	as	substrate-independent	forms	of	information	processing	[69,	75].	At	minimum,	it	suggests	that	mind	and	self	cannot	be	understood	without	deep	appreciation	of	the	constraints	and	opportunities	afforded	by	embodiment	and	allostasis.	More	radically,	it	underpins	a	strong	continuity	between	life,	mind,	and	consciousness	[21-23,	76].	The	implications	of	this	line	of	thinking	raise	many	questions	in	areas	from	artificial	intelligence	to	computational	psychiatry	(see	Outstanding	
Questions).	But	the	basic	message	is	simple.	We	perceive	the	world	around	us,	and	ourselves	within	it	because	of,	and	not	in	spite	of,	the	fact	that	we	are	beast	machines.				
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Box	1:		 Interoceptive	inference,	emotion,	and	mood	 	 	
	Existing	models	of	interoceptive	inference	primarily	target	emotional	and	affective	aspects	of	perception	and	self	[8,	17,	25,	47].	These	models	propose	that	interoceptive	experience	results	from	inference	on	the	hidden	causes	of	interoceptive	signals,	by	analogy	with	predictive	processing	models	of	exteroceptive	perception	[11,	12]	and	echoing	the	early	ideas	of	von	Helmholtz	of	perception	as	‘unconscious	inference’	[29,	30].	They	extend	earlier	theories	of	emotion	in	two	important	ways.	First,	like	‘appraisal’	theories	[77]	they	emphasize	the	importance	of	context	in	emotional	processing,	but	with	the	advantage	of	eliminating	any	bright	line	separating	emotion	(or	perception)	from	cognition.	Instead,	interoceptive	experience	is	determined	by	inferential	processes	operating	across	multiple	hierarchical	levels	and	encompassing	multiple	modalities.	Second,	instead	of	associating	each	emotion	with	a	discrete	neuronal	circuit	[78],	they	view	emotions	as	constructed	by	neural	processes,	such	as	perceptual	inference	and	memory,	which	reflect	principles	of	structural	and	functional	organisation	that	generalise	beyond	emotion	itself	[79].		As	with	the	relationship	between	exteroceptive	(e.g.,	visual)	perceptual	content	and	predictive	processing,	it	remains	an	open	question	as	to	how	interoceptive	experiences	map	onto	the	computational	machinery	of	interoceptive	inference	(see	e.g.,	[80,	81]	for	examples	in	vision	and	audition).	Interoceptive	experience	might	reflect	the	posterior	belief	directly	[8],	the	trajectories	of	interoceptive	prediction	error	(or	free	energy,	see	Box	2)	over	time	[82],	the	precision	(certainty)	of	the	predicted	somatic	consequences	of	(motoric	or	autonomic)	actions	[18,	82],	and/or	hyper-priors	over	this	precision.	Clark	and	colleagues	recently	suggested	a	hierarchical	arrangement	in	which	emotional	experience	reflects	precision,	while	mood	depends	on	the	hyper-prior	over	this	precision	(i.e.,	expected	precision)	[83].	In	this	interesting	view,	short	term	fluctuations	in	precision	(emotional	responses)	are	constrained	by	mood-related	hyperpriors	that	encode	their	long-term	average.	Beyond	this,	we	note	that	direct	empirical	evidence	for	interoceptive	inference	(e.g.,	interoceptive	prediction	errors)	remains	scarce	([84],	see	Outstanding	Questions).	Which	aspects	of	(active)	interoceptive	inference	shape	conscious	emotional	experience?	While	this	question	also	remains	open,	it	is	tempting	to	speculate	that	expectations	at	higher	(deeper)	levels	of	neuronal	hierarchies	are	more	likely	to	be	implicated,	largely	because	their	predictions	are	domain	general	and	can	therefore	be	articulated	through	autonomic	or	motor	reflexes.				
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Box	2:		 The	free	energy	principle	 	 	
	The	free	energy	principle	(FEP),	as	described	principally	by	Karl	Friston,	is	the	most	ambitious	of	theoretical	frameworks	related	to	predictive	processing	[28,	44].	According	to	the	FEP	all	organisms,	simply	by	virtue	of	existing,	are	mandated	to	minimize	the	entropy,	dispersion,	or	‘atypicality’	of	their	states.	In	other	words,	organisms	inhabit	states	in	which	they	expect	to	be	in	–	where	‘expect’	is	interpreted	in	terms	of	neuronally-encoded	probability	distributions,	not	personal-level	psychological	beliefs.	This	basic	condition	on	the	nature	of	living	organisms	stems	from	their	need	to	resist	the	tendency	towards	disorder	imposed	by	the	second	law	of	thermodynamics,	and	is	taken	to	apply	to	all	features	of	living	systems	-	from	their	gross	morphology	to	fine	details	of	cortical	microcircuitry	–	as	well	as	at	timescales	from	the	neuronal	to	the	phylogenetic	[23].	Entropy	is	the	long-term	average	of	(information-theoretic)	surprise,	which	cannot	be	directly	measured.	The	FEP	therefore	supposes	that	organisms	minimize	a	proxy	or	upper-bound,	which	is	called	the	(variational)	‘free	energy’.	Under	simplifying	assumptions	(including	Gaussian	distributions	and	independence/factorisation	of	time	scales),	free	energy	is	equivalent	to	precision-weighted	prediction	error,	which	means	that	schemes	like	predictive	coding	and	active	inference	[18,	32]	become	process	theories	(implementations)	under	the	FEP	[44].				While	the	mathematical	details	of	the	FEP	are	complicated	(see	[67]	for	a	recent	review),	the	basic	message	is	simple.	It	is	that	the	computational	machinery	of	predictive	perception	–	and	more	importantly	control-oriented	predictive	regulation	(instrumental	active	inference)	–	stems	from	basic	physical	principles	that	apply	to	all	living	systems	(perhaps	even	to	all	systems	that	can	be	said	to	exist,	or	to	persist;	the	notion	of	a	Markov	blanket	becomes	relevant	here	[23,	85]),	which	entail	that	such	systems	must	maintain	themselves	within	a	limited	repertoire	of	states.				Although	derived	from	different	traditions,	the	FEP	shows	clear	parallels	with	cybernetic	theories	which	emphasise	feedback,	control,	and	predictive	modelling	–	in	particular	the	‘good	regulator	theorem’	[41].	Indeed,	process	theories	which	specify	explicit	generative	models	for	active	inference	usefully	address	the	distinction	between	‘being	a	model’	and	‘having	a	model’	which	is	left	ambiguous	under	this	earlier	theorem	(Box	4).	Such	process	theories	also	provide	a	recipe	for	agent-based	models	[48,	86],	some	of	which	are	illustrating	the	conditions	under	which	generative	models	that	implement	effective	predictive	regulation	will	depart	from	‘veridical’	models	of	the	hidden	causes	of	sensory	signals	[53,	67].	Future	developments	
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of	these	models	will	shed	further	light	on	the	distinction	between	epistemic	and	instrumental	inference	[15].		
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Box	3:			 Psychopathology	of	disrupted	interoceptive	inference	 	
	Interoceptive	inference	provides	new	opportunities	to	relate	symptom	expression	to	altered	neurocomputational	mechanisms,	in	a	range	of	psychiatric	and	psychological	conditions	[34,	87].	Early	proposals	interpreted	anxiety	as	a	consequence	of	chronically	elevated	interoceptive	prediction	error	[88],	and	associated	dissociative	conditions	like	depersonalisation/derealisation	[89]	with	imprecise	interoceptive	predictions	[25].	While	these	proposals	remain	worth	investigating,	a	control-oriented	perspective	suggests	additional	targets.		Quattrocki	and	Friston	have	suggested	that	features	of	autistic	spectrum	disorder	(ASD)	arise	from	developmental	abnormalities	in	the	modulation	of	interoceptive	prediction	errors	[90].	In	their	view,	aberrant	modulation	of	the	(expected)	precision	of	interoceptive	prediction	errors	during	interactions	between	infants	and	caregivers	prevent	the	infant	from	developing	the	hierarchically-deep	generative	models	able	to	properly	attribute	hidden	causes	of	interoceptive	signals	to	‘self’	and	to	‘other’	(Box	5).	In	a	related	non-developmental	view,	Palmer	and	colleagues	suggested	that	social	symptoms	in	ASD	reflect	a	diminished	set	of	conditional	or	counterfactual	predictions	relating	to	inferred	states-of-mind	of	others	[91]	(see	also	[92]).	Such	inferentially-impoverished	mentalising	may	lead	to	diminished	‘perceptual	presence’	of	other	minds,	just	as	perceptual	presence	in	vision	may	be	diminished	when	generative	models	cannot	support	rich	predictions	about	the	sensory	consequences	of	actions	[55]	(see	Section:	The	body	is	not	just	an	object).	These	ideas	provides	interesting	contrasts	to	accounts	based	on	‘theory	of	mind’	[93],	and	may	explain	the	autonomic	hypersensitivity	and	other	interoceptive	symptoms	that	are	often	observed	in	individuals	with	autism	–	as	well	as	difficulties	engaging	with	exteroceptive	prosocial	cues	[94,	95].			Another	important	application	is	to	depression.	Barrett	and	colleagues	consider	depression	an	allostatic	disorder	in	which	the	brain	becomes	pathologically	insensitive	to	prediction	error	signals	and,	consequently,	less	effective	in	terms	of	(metabolic)	energy	regulation	[47].	They	argue	that	a	metabolically	inefficient	internal	model	of	the	‘body	in	the	world’	accounts	for	a	wide	variety	of	symptoms	and	aetiologies	associated	with	depression,	including	its	pervasive	negative	affect	and	association	with	apathy	and	fatigue.	In	a	related	view,	Stephan	and	colleagues	propose	that	fatigue	and	depression	are	sequential	responses	to	interoceptive	experiences	of	dyshomeostasis	(fatigue)	and	subsequent	metacognitive	beliefs	about	low	
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allostatic	self-efficacy	(depression)	[37],	extending	early	ideas	based	on	‘learned	helplessness’	and	generalised	loss-of-control	[96].	Clark	and	colleagues	similarly	emphasize	precision,	associating	major	depression	with	being	certain	about	encountering	uncertain	environments,	thereby	precluding	effective	allostatic	regulation	[83].	These	proposals,	while	distinct,	share	features	–	and	all	emphasise	interoceptive	inference.	Future	work	employing	computational	psychiatry	methods	could	arbitrate	among	them,	as	well	as	isolating	opportunities	for	patient	stratification	and	intervention	[97],	and	extension	to	radical	disturbances	of	selfhood	such	as	Cotard’s	syndrome,	where	people	believe	that	they	do	not	exist	[25,	98].		
 
		
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	 	
	 20	
Box	4:		 Being	a	model	versus	having	a	model			 		Is	there	any	substantive	difference	–	when	it	comes	to	experiences	of	embodiment	and	selfhood	–	between	systems	that	explicitly	deploy	a	predictive	model,	as	compared	to	systems	that	are	merely	aptly	described	in	model-based	terms?	Most	process	theories	(implementations,	e.g.,	predictive	coding)	relevant	to	interoceptive	inference	imply	that	neural	states	encode	the	parameters	(sufficient	statistics)	of	a	generative	model	which	maps	between	sensory	data	and	their	hidden	causes	[67].	However,	broader	theoretical	frameworks	like	the	free	energy	principle	(Box	2)	and	the	good	regulator	theorem	[41],	which	emphasize	regulation,	do	not	in	themselves	mandate	the	existence	of	an	explicitly	encoded	generative	model;	only	that	systems	behave	in	ways	that	are	well	described	this	way	[85].	Since	regulation	can	in	principle	occur	with	or	without	explicitly	encoded	generative	models,	the	way	in	which	systems	engage	in	allostatic	regulation	may	have	consequences	for	self-related	phenomenology.		Simple	forms	of	regulation	such	as	first-order	homeostatic	feedback	can	be	thought	of	as	simply	‘being	a	model’.	More	complex	regulation,	involving	inferential,	anticipatory	(forecasting),	and	flexible	control,	may	require	explicit	generative	modelling.	This	can	be	described	as	‘having	a	model’.	This	distinction	recalls	an	old	debate	in	cognitive	science	as	to	whether	systems	explicitly	represent	properties	of	their	environment,	or	whether	they	merely	act	as	if	they	do	[99].	In	the	context	of	interoceptive	inference,	explicit	generative	modelling	is	particularly	relevant	in	virtue	of	supporting	predictions	about	the	future	somatic	effects	of	actions	(forecasting),	in	the	context	of	the	intrinsic	dynamics	of	the	body	and	the	environment	(which	includes	other	embodied	agents,	see	Box	5)	[34].			While	this	distinction	is	unlikely	to	remain	sharp,	it	helps	bring	into	view	a	range	of	possible	control	structures	of	increasing	model-based	explicitness	and	hierarchical	depth.	We	suggest	that	as	control	mechanisms	develop	in	these	directions,	the	associated	phenomenology	of	selfhood	may	develop	from	experiences	of	being	an	embodied	organism,	to	experiences	of	mood	and	emotion,	pre-reflective	experiences	of	selfhood	and	‘mineness’,	and	finally	to	explicit	self-awareness,	metacognitive	insight,	reflective	self-awareness,	and	social	aspects	of	selfhood.		(See	[62]	for	a	discussion	in	terms	of	representational	‘transparency’	and	‘opacity’.)			
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Box	5:			 Development	of	the	interoceptive	self			If	interoceptive	inference	is	needed	for	keeping	the	organism	within	regimes	of	physiological	viability,	at	the	beginning	of	human	life	this	process	is	critically	dependent	on	caregivers.	Human	infants	are	born	lacking	the	ability	to	perform	autonomously	the	actions	needed	for	addressing	their	internal	sensations	and	needs.	From	eating	and	drinking	to	thermoregulation	and	sleep,	their	bodily	regulation	depends	on	others;	specifically,	on	intersubjective	carer-infant	embodied	and	affective	interactions.			Such	intersubjective	approaches	have	recently	been	extended	to	interoception	[19].	The	development	of	visceral	and	emotional	neural	circuitry	depends	on	a	caregiver-infant	relationship	[100,	101],	often	conceptualized	as	homeostatic	regulation	[101].	The	first	months	post-partum	are	characterized	by	relative	instability	of	key	cardiovascular	variables	(e.g.	heart	rate	variability,	vagal	tone)	that	become	moderately	stable	by	the	end	of	the	first	year	[100].	Importantly,	their	levels	depend	on	caregiving	[102]	such	as	parent-infant	contingency	during	interaction	[103],	and	are	predictive	of	self-regulation	abilities	at	the	age	of	three	[104].		Beyond	homeostasis	per	se,	such	interactions	enable	the	infant	to	learn	to	associate	specific	homeostatic	needs	(e.g.,	pain)	and	their	behavioural	expression	(e.g.,	crying)	to	contingent	allostatic	responses	from	the	carer	(e.g.,	soothing	rather	than	feeding;	see	[19]).	Given	the	infant’s	inability	to	perform	the	required	allostatic	actions,	it	is	the	caregiver’s	task	to	do	so	(see	Glossary	and	also	[105]).	This	depends	on	their	ability	to	correctly	infer	the	hidden	causes	of	the	infant’s	putative	interoceptive	prediction	error	and	provide	an	appropriate	response.	The	accumulation	of	such	responses,	derived	from	precise	interoceptive	predictions	performed	by	the	carer	on	behalf	of	the	infants,	will	eventually	lead	to	the	construction,	by	the	infant,	of	a	predictive	model	of	their	interoceptive	body.	Consequently,	imprecise	inference	of	the	infant’s	hidden	causes	of	interoceptive	changes	may	hinder	the	development	of	an	allostatically	adequate	model.	On	this	view,	early	coupled	intersubjective	embodied	iterations	provide	the	necessary	precision-weighting,	so	that	it	is	with	others	that	we	develop	a	sense	of	ourselves	‘from	within’.			It	has	been	recently	shown	that	parental	interoceptive	sensitivity,	measured	neurally	(as	reflected	in	anterior	insula	activity)	as	well	as	behaviorally,	during	the	first	months	of	parenting	was	predictive	of	their	children's	somatic	symptoms	six	years	later	[106].	These	
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findings	provide	tentative	support	to	the	crucial	role	that	carer-child	interactions	play	in	supporting	interoceptive	development,	and	they	chart	two	pathways	that	may	shape	interoceptive	sensitivity	cross-generationally.	The	first,	consisting	of	the	amygdala	and	oxytocin	system,	supports	attention	to	arousal	modulations	in	response	to	social	cues.	The	second,	involving	anterior	insula,	supports	higher-order	interoceptive	representations	that	underpin	embodiment	and	self-awareness.		Such	interoceptive	approaches	to	self-development	coupled	with	new	methods	for	assessing	interoceptive	sensitivity	in	infants,	such	as	the	Infant	Heartbeat	Task	(iBEAT	[20]),	will	enable	us	to	study	the	ontogenetic	development	of	interoception,	mentalization		and	metacognition	of	bodily	experience	[92,	107],	and	will	advance	our	understanding	of	developmental	disorders	such	as	autism	[90,	108],	eating	disorders	[109]	and	affective	disorders	[18].				
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Outstanding	questions			
• What	are	the	specific	neurophysiological	signatures	of	interoceptive	predictions	and	prediction	errors,	and	where	are	they	localized	in	the	brain?		
• Can	the	proposed	phenomenological	differences	between	epistemic	and	instrumental	(active)	inference	be	tested	in	a	non-interoceptive	domain,	like	vision?	
• Given	the	importance	of	interoception	and	physiological	regulation	in	embodied	selfhood,	what	might	be	the	roles	of	epigenetics,	the	immune	system,	the	microbiome,	and	other	somatic	systems	on	the	interoceptive	predictions	underlying	experiences	of	self	and	affect?	
• If	perceptions	of	self	and	world	arise	from	fundamental	imperatives	towards	allostatic	regulation,	what	are	the	prospects	for	artificial	intelligence	and	machine	consciousness?		Would	a	robot	need	to	be	‘alive’	in	order	to	be	ascribed,	or	to	ascribe	itself,	with	selfhood?	
• Can	new	cognitive	behavioral	therapy	treatments	be	grounded	in	refining	people’s	predictive	models	of	their	ability	to	allostatically	regulate,	for	instance	by	training	metacognitive	awareness	of	interoceptive	signals?		
• Are	the	targets	of	allostatic	control	set	points	or	ranges?	And	if	the	latter,	can	ideas	about	so-called	‘rein-control’	(two	complementary	control	systems,	like	the	reins	used	to	steer	horses)	be	mapped	to	the	neuroanatomy	of	allostasis?	
• How	does	the	ontogenetic	development	of	interoceptive	awareness	link	to	other	dimensions	of	self-awareness	in	early	life,	such	as	self-recognition	and	how	does	it	change	during	other	critical	developmental	periods	such	as	adolescence?				 	
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Glossary		
	
Active	inference:	An	extension	of	predictive	processing,	and	part	of	the	free	energy	principle,	which	says	that	agents	can	suppress	prediction	errors	by	performing	actions	to	bring	about	sensory	states	in	line	with	predictions	[28,	32,	67].		
Allostasis:	A	form	of	regulation	which	emphasizes	the	process	of	achieving	stability	through	change,	for	example	by	the	dynamic	and	anticipatory	allocation	of	resources	to	ensure	the	stability	of	core	regulatory	targets.	The	precise	relationship	between	allostasis	and	homeostasis	is	still	debated	(e.g.,	[39]).		
Appraisal	theories	of	emotion:	A	long-standing	tradition,	dating	back	to	James	(but	not	Lange)	according	to	which	emotions	depend	on	cognitive	interpretations	of	physiological	changes	[61].				
Essential	variables:	Physiological	quantities	which	must	remain	within	specific	bounds	for	an	organism	to	remain	viable	(to	stay	alive).	The	term	is	associated	with	the	20th	Century	cybernetician	W.	Ross	Ashby	[66].		
Epistemic	inference:	A	subset	of	active	inference	where	actions	serve	primarily	to	enhance	generative	models,	through	discovering	more	about	the	hidden	causes	of	sensory	signals,	therefore	enabling	enhanced	prediction	error	minimization	in	the	long	run.		
Free	energy	principle:	A	generalization	of	predictive	processing	according	to	which	organisms	minimize	a	lower	bound	on	the	entropy	of	sensory	signals	(the	free	energy).		Under	some	assumptions	free	energy	translates	to	precision-weighted	prediction	error	[44].		
Generative	model:	A	probabilistic	model	linking	(hidden)	causes	and	data,	usually	specified	in	terms	of	the	likelihoods	(of	observing	some	data	given	their	causes),	and	priors	(on	these	causes).	Generative	models	can	be	used	to	generate	fictive	data	samples	of	the	sort	needed	to	guide	active	inference.		
Good	regulator	theorem:	A	thesis	from	cybernetics	which	claims	to	show,	under	broad	conditions,	that	‘every	good	regulator	of	a	system	must	be	a	model	of	that	system’	[41].			
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Interoception:	The	sense	of	the	internal	physiological	condition	of	the	body	[14].		Interoception,	as	used	here,	encompasses	afferent	sensory	signals	(interosensations)	from	the	viscera	as	well	as	low-level	monitoring	of	blood	chemistry	and	sensations	evoked	by	affective	touch	or	pain,	interoceptive	perceptions	which	comprise	perceptual	inferences	about	the	body	states	that	cause	interosensations,	and	interoactions	which	implement	allostatic	control	through	autonomic	reflexes	[34].		
Instrumental	inference:	A	subset	of	active	inference	in	which	actions	serve	primarily	to	regulate	perceptual	variables	(and	their	hidden	causes).	Equivalently,	control-oriented	inference.		
Markov	blanket:	A	Markov	blanket	defines	the	boundaries	of	a	system	in	a	statistical	sense,	so	that	variables	within	the	blanket	are	conditionally	independent	of	those	outside	the	blanket,	and	vice	versa	[85].		
Perceptual	control	theory:	A	relatively	overlooked	theory,	developed	by	William	Powers	and	based	on	principles	of	hierarchically-nested	negative	feedback,	which	interprets	behavior	as	implementing	the	control	of	perceptual	variables	–	rather	than	perception	controlling	behavior	[42].	
	
Predictive	coding:	A	data	processing	strategy	whereby	signals	are	represented	by	generative	models.	Predictive	coding	is	typically	implemented	by	message-passing	architectures	in	which	top-down	signals	convey	predictions	and	bottom-up	signals	convey	prediction	errors	[27].		
Predictive	processing:	A	theoretical	framework	in	which	perception,	action	and	cognition	depend	on	the	deployment	of	multi-level	generative	models	to	predict	the	incoming	sensory	barrage	[11].	Predictive	coding	is	an	implementation	of	predictive	processing.				
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